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Assessing the Endogeneity of OCA Conditions in EMU 
 
Carlos Vieira and Isabel Vieira 





The academic  and political discussion about which countries  met the conditions  for 
joining EMU was decisively  influenced  by the  Frankel and  Rose (1997) hypothesis 
concerning endogenous OCA properties. The answer to their question "Is EMU more 
justifiable ex post than ex ante?" was a definite yes in their ex ante analysis. Our ex post 
examination of the euro's first decade, however suggests that the hypothesis does not 
hold for some countries. This paper utilizes panel data estimation techniques to compute 
OCA  indices  that  help  assess  the  OCA  endogeneity  hypothesis  and  signal  current 
external and fiscal imbalances. 
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1 - Introduction 
The  hypothesis  of  endogenous  optimum  currency  areas  (OCA),  suggesting  that 
economic and monetary integration are self reinforcing processes, had an important role 
in shaping the European economic and monetary union (EMU). It provided academic 
support to the political will to strengthen the level of integration in the European Union 
(EU) and may have influenced peripheral countries’ decisions to attempt an early entry 
into EMU, in the hope that the much needed convergence of their economies would be 
easier and quicker under a common currency. Ten years into EMU, the dire economic 
and social conditions currently evidenced by those countries, which in some cases have 
cast doubt on their capacity to continue in EMU, suggest that, at least in their case, the 
expected  improvement  of  OCA  properties  may  have  failed  to  materialize  or  was 
insufficient to allow smooth adjustment following a crisis. 
In this study, we assess the endogeneity of the OCA conditions for the first group of 
EMU  members  plus  Greece.  We  use  the  OCA  index  proposed  by  Bayoumi  and 
Eichengreen (1997) which assesses compliance with OCA properties and is obtained 
with  an  out-of-sample  approach  based  on  a  two-step  procedure.  The  relationship 
between bilateral exchange-rate variability and a set of traditional OCA conditions is 
first estimated using panel data techniques and a data set covering 21 members and non-
members of EMU during the two pre-euro decades. In a second step, the OCA index is 
derived from the estimated equation and extrapolated to obtain the index values for the 
post-euro period. The computed indices for each EMU member in the last three decades 
are the basis for our assessment of the behavior of OCA properties before and after the 
introduction of the euro.   3 
Our analysis adds to the empirical OCA literature in three ways. Firstly, we employ a 
more complete and updated dataset and more robust panel-data estimation techniques to 
compute the index proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997). Secondly, we project 
the estimated indices to the post-euro decade in order to assess the OCA endogeneity 
hypothesis. Thirdly, we consider whether the OCA  indices could  have  been a good 
predictor of the difficulties now emerging in the fragile member states.  
This work may be of interest for current EMU candidates trying to determine the best 
timing to adopt the common currency and whether such move would speed up their 
catching up process. It may also be useful for countries in other continents, already 
involved  in  less  rigorous  economic  integration  schemes  but  ultimately  aiming  at 
monetary integration. 
Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998) developed ex ante assessments of the OCA endogeneity 
hypothesis and concluded that the European monetary union would be more justifiable 
ex  post.  Their  studies  uncovered  the  convergence  effects  of  economic  integration 
amongst EU members but could not cover a period of time long enough to expose the 
trends set in motion by the euro. Comparing the decades preceding the introduction of 
the common currency with the one that followed, we ask whether, as suggested by ex 
ante analyses, EMU is indeed a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
We  find out that, in general, the OCA properties have  improved  for  most  analyzed 
countries, either members or non-members of EMU, but the EMU periphery has not 
performed as well as predicted by the endogeneity hypothesis. The distance separating 
peripheral and core economies before the introduction of the euro remains practically 
unchanged after ten years of adopting the common currency. We also obtain positive 
cross-country correlations between the values of the OCA index before EMU and the   4 
fiscal and current account deficits in 2009, suggesting that the index can be a useful 
indicator of future troubles in less-prepared economies. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  section  two  briefly  surveys  some 
theoretical and empirical aspects of OCA theory and their impact on the development of 
the European monetary union project; section three describes the data and the variables 
used in the statistical analysis and estimates the model; section four computes the OCA 
indices for the pre- and post-euro periods and examines the hypothesis that the OCA 
characteristics are endogenous to EMU; section five compares the values of the index at 
the time of accession with the current fiscal and external imbalances displayed by the 
European countries; section six concludes and discusses some policy implications 
 
2 – EMU and the OCA theory 
The idea of monetary integration was in the minds of the architects of the European 
integration project almost from its inception in the late 1950s. However, the road to 
monetary union proved to be long, because EMU, though politically desirable, involved 
exceptional  processes  with  uncertain  outcomes.  Its  members  give  up  much  of  their 
economic  autonomy  while  retaining  political  independence.  To  date,  no  other 
multinational venture has attempted to reach such high levels of economic and monetary 
integration  without  fiscal  and/or  political  centralization.  Consequently,  no  real  case 
scenarios could be studied to anticipate the consequences of EMU membership or to 
decide which countries should join, postpone, or opt-out. 
In order to guarantee the sustainability of the single-currency project, candidates were 
required to meet a set of nominal conditions, the so-called Maastricht criteria, before   5 
being allowed to join.
1 However, regardless of the specificity and mandatory status of 
such requirements, the selection  of countries  to enter EMU was more political than 
technical. 
The originality of the EMU project stimulated a large political and academic debate 
about its reasonability and the main advantages and costs for participating countries. 
Many discussions were grounded on OCA theory which, overall, suggests that monetary 
union  is  more beneficial  for open economies  much  involved  in  mutual trade and 
displaying  synchronized  business cycles, high levels of  labor  mobility or price and 
wages  flexibility, and  financial  a nd  fiscal  integration.
2  Since  monetary  integration 
entails the loss of autonomy over domestic monetary policy and of exchange -rate 
flexibility,  OCA  conditions  should  either  substitute  for  them  or  render  them  less 
necessary. 
Despite  its  popularity,  recognit ion  of  OCA  theory  as  a  suitable  tool  to  evaluate 
monetary integration in general and EMU in particular has varied over time. It was one 
of the most prominent references up to the  1970s, lost predominance in the  1980s and 
regained it from the 1990s onward. The works of Frankel and Rose (1997,  1998) were 
especially important to the revival of the theory. They formulated and provided  ex ante 
empirical support for the endogeneity hypothesis, saying that, though a set of candidates 
did not constitute an OCA before EMU, they would become one as a consequence of 
entering it, rendering monetary integration more justifiable ex post.  
                                                 
1  The  Maastricht  criteria  were  nominal  requirements  of  price  stability,  fiscal  prudence,  successful 
European Monetary System membership and interest rate convergence.  
2 A recent comprehensive survey of the more relevant theoretical and empirical OCA developments may 
be found in Dellas and Tavlas (2009).   6 
The OCA endogeneity argument may have influenced decisions to enter and allow entry 
to EMU.
3 In the second half of the  1990s, especially in the southern EU countries, 
domestic  economic policies were  greatly restricted by the short -term objective of 
fulfilling the nominal convergence criteria. Economic structures in the South were 
rather different from those of the EU core, but the alternative of postponing entry until 
attaining a higher degree of real convergence was dismissed, perhaps due to political 
fear of  being an EMU outcast, but due also to the leap of faith that the catching up 
would be quicker under monetary integration.
4   
Early studies considered the OCA conditions as a static  conditio  sine  qua  non  for 
adopting  the  single  currency.  However,  dynamic  effects  are  relevant  in  analyses  of 
monetary  integration  and  are  at  the  core  of  two  paradigms,  anticipating  opposing 
scenarios for the future of EMU: the OCA endogeneity hypothesis due to Frankel and 
Rose  (1997,  1998),  and  the  specialization  hypothesis  proposed  by  Krugman  (1991, 
1993).  
Frankel and Rose viewed the OCA conditions as ‘jointly endogenous’, rejecting static 
evaluations of individual OCA properties. Focusing on the extent of trade and on the 
similarity of shocks and business cycles inside a currency area, the authors predicted 
that savings in transactions costs following the adoption of the single currency would 
intensify  trade  between  EMU  countries  which  would,  in  turn,  synchronize  business 
cycles. 
                                                 
3  The European  Parliament  also  added  to  the  spreading  of  the  idea  that  economic  conditions  would 
improve under EMU, by concluding, in a report published in 1998, that ‘many of the asymmetries might 
be removed by the coordination within EMU of economic policies, … and by the fact of monetary union 
itself’ (our underlining, in European Parliament, 1998, pp. 5 – 6). 
4 The impact of political agendas on the design of the road to monetary integration in Europe is analysed, 
for instance, in Feldstein (1997).    7 
Krugman, on the other hand, considered the possibility of more intense trade relations 
promoting  less,  rather  than  more,  synchronized  business  cycles.  If,  following  the 
reduction  in  trading  costs,  attempts  to take  advantage  of  increasing  returns to  scale 
motivated the relocation of firms and changes in regional industrial structures, more 
trade  would  lead  to  a  higher  level  of  productive  specialization.  In  such  a  case,  the 
probability of asymmetric shocks would increase and the synchronization of business 
cycles would decline.  
In  this  study,  we  examine  indirectly  whether  more  specialization,  or  more 
synchronization, has been promoted by EMU. We do so by contrasting the values of the 
OCA  index  before  and  after  the  introduction  of  the  common  currency.  This  index, 
proposed  by  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen  (1997),  has  also  been  utilized  in  studies 
identifying the determinants of exchange-rate variability (as in Horváth, 2005) and in 
analyses  assessing  the  eligibility  of  specific  countries  or  groups  of  countries  for 
monetary integration. Some of the latter focused in African or Asian economies but 
most  analyzed  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  (CEECs),  producing  mixed 
conclusions regarding their capacity to join the single currency.
5  
The absence of consensus in empirical assessments of the CEECs’ readiness for EMU 
enhances the utility of the lessons that can be drawn from the current experience of 
countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal or Spain. It is thus interesting to determine 
whether participation  in EMU  appears to have  improved  individual countries’ OCA 
qualities  and  if  convergence  has  been  facilitated  by  the  dynamics  of  economic  and 
monetary integration.  
                                                 
5 Analyses of African and Asian countries may be found, respectively, in Bangaké (2008) and in Achsani 
and  Partisiwi  (2010).  Bénassy-Quéré  and  Lahrèche-Révil  (2000),  Cincibuch  and  Vávra  (2001), 
Schweickert (2001), Sadeh (2005) or Horvàth (2007) focused in the CEECs.   8 
In order to address these questions, we estimate the model proposed by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen  (1997)  and  then  utilize  the  estimates  to  construct  individual  countries’ 
OCA  indices.  Extending  the  period  of  time  assessed  by  those  authors  but  utilizing 
similar variables for the same set of countries, we test the robustness of the original 
approach and its current value.  
 
3 – The OCA determinants of exchange rate variability 
In the estimating equation below, the variability of bilateral exchange rates is dependent 
on a series of explanatory variables that encapsulate traditional OCA  desiderata: the 
asymmetry  of  business  cycles  between  the  two  countries,  dissimilarity  in  the 
composition of their exports, their bilateral openness ratio and their average economic 
dimension: 
 
  sderijt = 0 + 1 sdyijt + 2 dissimijt + 3 btradeijt + 4 sizeijt + eijt,  
 
where the dependent variable sderijt is the standard deviation over a ten-year period of 
the yearly log-variations in the bilateral nominal exchange rate between countries i and 
j,  sdyijt  is  the  standard  deviation  of  the  difference  in  the  log  of  real  output  growth 
between countries i and j, dissimijt is the sum of the absolute differences in the relative 
share of each of eleven chain categories of merchandise trade in each pair of countries,
6 
btradeijt is the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic GDP in both countries, 
sizeijt is the mean of the two countries' log of GDP measured in US dollars, and eijt is the 
                                                 
6  Bayoumi  and Eichengreen  (1997)  considered  only  three  categories:  manufactured  goods,  food  and 
minerals. We chose the more detailed and informative classification from Chelem and used its eleven 
categories of products by chains: energy, food agriculture, textiles, wood paper, chemicals, iron and steel, 
non ferrous, machinery, vehicles, electrical and electronic.   9 
stochastic error term. All variables are measured as averages over a ten-year period. The 
original hypothesis is that countries meeting the OCA conditions to a greater degree 
face more stable exchange rates. Therefore all coefficients are expected to be positive 
except for 3 (as bilateral exchange rates are apt to be less volatile if the other country is 
an important trade partner). 
Data on bilateral nominal exchange rates were collected from the IMF's International 
Financial  Statistics;  GDP  at  constant  prices  in  domestic  currency  comes  from  the 
OECD statistical database; all the trade-related variables and current GDP in US dollars 
were computed from the CEPII-Chelem database. 
The equation above was estimated for the pre-euro period using panel data comprising 
420 annual observations, covering the two ten-year periods prior to EMU, 1979-88 and 
1989-98, and including 21 OECD countries: eleven EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), 
three  non-EMU,  EU  members  (Denmark,  Sweden  and  the  UK),  and  seven  non-EU 
countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the US). A 
dummy  variable  for the period 1979-88 (d88)  was also  included to account  for the 
higher average exchange-rate variability in the 1980s. Using panel data allows, among 
other  benefits,  more  degrees  of  freedom  and  control  for  state-  and  time-invariant 
variables, producing more reliable parameter estimates.  
The estimation with a random-effects model (the Hausman test allowed using the more 
efficient model with consistent results) produced the following results (standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, the overall R-squared is 0.504): 
   10 
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All  coefficients are  statistically  significant at the one per cent confidence  level  and 
display the expected signs. The results suggest that the standard OCA factors help to 
explain  the  dynamics  of  bilateral  exchange-rate  variability,  confirming  the  previous 
findings in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997),
7 although using a different methodology, 
a wider time frame, and a slightly different  dissimijt  variable. In order to check the 
stability  of  the  coefficients  over  time,  seventeen  consecutive  cross-section  estimates 
have been performed for ten-year periods between 1973 and 1998. They display largely 
stable coefficients. Only the coefficient on sdyijt, the proxy for asymmetric shocks, is 
much lower, albeit still significant, during the first half of the  1980s. This probably 
reflects the relatively faster convergence dynamics of business cycles observable in the 
data for that period. 
 
4 - The OCA indices 
Like Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), we use our estimated equation to compute an 
index that compares each EU country's OCA characteristics relatively to a reference 
country. While those authors, and all later previously cited studies, calculated the index 
with the objective of ascertaining the readiness of EU countries to join EMU by the end 
of the 1990s, we will compare the pre- and post-EMU values of the index to assess the 
Frankel and Rose (1998) hypothesis that the OCA conditions are endogenous and to 
associate the index with the current financial distress faced by some EMU members.  
                                                 
7 Later updated in Horváth (2007), who added some other factors to the OCA variables, removed Greece 
from the sample and estimated the equation by the generalized method of moments, obtaining similar 
results albeit a non-significant dissim variable.   11 
The index in Table 1 is computed for the relationship between Germany, traditionally 
regarded as the EU's anchor country, and every other European country in the sample. It 
covers three consecutive periods, 1979/88, 1989/98 and the post-euro decade 1999/08. 
The index corresponds to the fitted value for exchange-rate variability using the point 
estimates of the parameters obtained above and extrapolating for the post-euro period, 
when no exchange-rate variability can occur within the euro area. The index is thus a 
weighted sum of each country's various OCA conditions, taking the equation above as 
deterministic.  The  smaller  the  value  of  the  index,  the  more  do  the  two  countries 
approximate an OCA.  
 
Table 1: Rankings of OCA indices for the European countries 
1988    1998    2008 
Belgium  0.020863    Austria  0.015614    Belgium  0.004140 
Netherlands  0.024403    Belgium  0.016492    Austria  0.007289 
Austria  0.036674    Netherlands  0.034632    Netherlands  0.027735 
Switzerland  0.051694    Switzerland  0.052123    Switzerland  0.030635 
Sweden  0.056076    Portugal  0.064444    Finland  0.046565 
Ireland  0.061380    Denmark  0.065629    Denmark  0.050288 
Italy  0.062442    Italy  0.068813    Sweden  0.056337 
Finland  0.065084    France  0.068879    Portugal  0.057107 
France  0.067177    Ireland  0.071243    France  0.061956 
Denmark  0.076095    Spain  0.075275    Italy  0.069225 
Greece  0.079408    Sweden  0.078343    Spain  0.073169 
Norway  0.085351    Greece  0.088137    UK  0.077663 
Portugal  0.089102    Norway  0.091547    Norway  0.078126 
UK  0.090104    UK  0.098829    Greece  0.091322 
Spain  0.092621    Finland  0.117182    Ireland  0.095113 
Note: The index is computed using the regression estimates obtained above for the bilateral relationships 
with Germany. 
 
The countries are arranged in ascending order of the value of the index in each period 
(which is in descending order of their OCA ranking). The table reveals that Austria, 
Belgium and the Netherlands remain in the top three, Switzerland is always fourth, the   12 
two oil producers, Norway and the UK, always rank next to each other near the bottom 
of the table, and the other countries change  slightly their relative positions between 
periods. These relative positions for the pre-euro rankings are quite similar to those 
obtained by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) or, using a different approach, by Kim 
and Chow (2003). 
The evolution of the index and the changes in the rankings may be more perceptible in 
Figures 1 and 2, where all points below the 45-degree line from the origin indicate a 
declining index and thus that the country improved its classification in terms of the 
OCA factors between the two periods. Pursuant to OCA theory, a country closer to the 
origin is more prepared to deal with the constraints of a single currency. 
 
Figures 1 and 2: Change in the OCA indices, 1988-1998 and 1998-2008 
 
 
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands are the countries most closely tied to Germany's 
economy. Portugal and Spain were at the bottom of the table in the period 1979/88 but, 
following accession to the EU in 1986, greatly improved the quantitative measure of 
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index between the 1980s and the 1990s. Finland dips to the bottom of the table, due to 
severe economic and banking crises in the early 1990s. Apart from Finland, the bottom-
ranked five countries in the period immediately preceding EMU are, according to the 
OCA index, those that have not been able or chose not to adopt the euro or to be a 
member of the EU (UK, Norway, Greece and Sweden). Above this group are ranked 
those countries that were immediately admitted to EMU but are currently, with Greece, 
experiencing the most difficulty coping with membership (Ireland, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy). The OCA index could thus have served as an indicator of the difficulties to come, 
suggesting that these countries should have postponed entry. 
The right-hand figure, which compares the immediate pre- and post-euro periods, shows 
that all the latter countries (plus Greece, which joined the euro in 2001) have fallen in 
their OCA index ranking, notably Ireland and Greece, the only two  countries in the 
sample actually increasing significantly their index values between 1998 and 2008. In 
fact, most countries display lower values in the post-euro period, apparently confirming 
the endogeneity hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1998). The same progress also occurs, 
however, in non-EMU countries, suggesting that common, more global, factors must be 
considered. 
 
5 - The OCA index and the fiscal and external imbalances 
The ability of the OCA index to signal the conditions for joining a monetary union, and 
thus  to  anticipate  problems  due  to  the  loss  of  the  traditional  domestic  policy 
instruments, can be further supported by comparing the index for each country with its 
current fiscal and external positions.    14 
In the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, some euro area countries, 
mostly Mediterranean, face major economic problems that may even threaten their place 
in  the  euro  area  or,  in  the  extreme,  the  long-run  survival  of  the  European  single 
currency.  The  main  problem  for  these  countries  is  their  substantial  loss  of 
competitiveness against their northern euro partners and third countries, reflected in the 
build-up of major fiscal and external imbalances (see, for instance, Blanchard, 2007, 
Geppert and Stephan, 2008, or Shelburne 2010). 
Figure 3 illustrates the connection between each country’s OCA index value for 1998 
and  its  government’s  fiscal  imbalances  in  2009.  It  reveals  a  clear  cross-country 
correlation  between  those  variables,  particularly  evident  when  excluding  the  Nordic 
countries. 
 
Figure 3: General government deficits in 2009 and the 1998 OCA index 
 
Government deficits (% of GDP) on the vertical axis 
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This  correlation  was  absent  in  the  pre-euro  period,  as  was  noted  by  Bayoumi  and 
Eichengreen  (1997)  when  comparing  the  OCA  index  with  the  Maastricht  criteria, 
possibly due either to an exceptional fiscal consolidation effort at the time, aimed at 
complying  with  the  criteria  or to  creative  accounting  and  a  lack  of  transparency  in 
budget reporting. 
A similar correlation pattern can be found by comparing, as in Figure 4, the 1998 OCA 
index  with  the  2009  current-account  deficit  of  each  European  country.  Again,  the 
correlation  coefficient  significantly  increases  when  not  considering  the  three  Nordic 
countries. 
 
Figure 4: Current account deficits in 2009 and the 1998 OCA index 
 
Current account deficits (% of GDP) on the vertical axis 
Source: Table 1 and European Central Bank 
 
Many, mostly politicians, had expected that being in the euro,  with its guarantee of 
macroeconomic  stability  and  lower  interest  rates,  would  help  to  increase 
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hypothesis  may  have  helped  fuel this expectation. Reality,  however, has shown that 
competitiveness has fallen in some of the less prepared members, now that devaluation 
is no longer an option. As suggested by Christodoulakis (2009), the access to cheaper 
capital  provided  by  EMU  membership  has  aggravated  pre-existing  current-account 
deficits  in  peripheral  countries.  Unlike  the  core  EMU  members,  the  periphery  has 
attracted relatively more investment in the non-tradable sector (the housing boom being 
a good example), which resulted in a progressive deterioration of the trade balance. 
 
 
6 – Conclusions 
Despite the wishful thinking that EMU would generate its own success, the prospect of 
monetary integration in Europe was always controversial. When eleven EU countries 
entered the third stage of EMU in 1999, proving wrong those who predicted that such a 
project would  never  see the  light of day, optimists celebrated  but critics waited  for 
developments to confirm their belief that the euro was ‘a bad idea’. They did not have to 
wait more than a decade for the first serious problems. Following the 2007 financial 
crisis,  the  aggravated  structural  problems  encountered  by  some  euro  zone  members 
raised doubts about the survival of the euro and also about the validity of the OCA 
endogeneity hypothesis. 
The  endogeneity  hypothesis  has  been  subject  to  various  assessments.  Many  have 
anticipated a priori that EMU would be closer to an OCA after its completion, but only 
ex  post  tests  can  determine  whether  this  has  in  fact  been  the  case,  and  only  if  the 
hypothesis is confirmed by all participating countries irrespective of specific start-up 
characteristics.    17 
Ten years into EMU, we have developed an evaluation of OCA endogenous properties 
to  ascertain  whether  the  assumption  that  may  have  played  an  important  part  in  the 
shaping of the European monetary union has been validated with the passage of time. 
Utilizing the OCA index first proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), we have 
compared individual countries’ compliance with selected OCA conditions before and 
after the adoption of the euro. We conclude that OCA properties have improved in the 
last decade for practically all analyzed countries, either members or non-members of 
EMU, and thus that the improvement cannot be attributed solely to increased monetary 
integration. The more peripheral EMU countries actually displayed stronger signs of 
convergence during the decade preceding the adoption of the common currency than 
during the one that followed. Therefore, the much expected quicker convergence within 
EMU  did  not  materialize,  or the  level  attained  so  far  was  insufficient  to  allow  the 
smooth adjustment of those economies in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
Our estimates indicate that EMU itself did not improve the OCA characteristics of all 
participants, failing especially in cases where confirmation of that expectation was most 
critical. In fact, while the verification of the OCA endogeneity hypothesis would require 
decreasing indices after EMU, Greece and Ireland increased their values in the first 
decade  of  membership,  while  Portugal  and  Spain  continued  to  display  much  larger 
values than the countries with the best performance.   
Our analysis also suggests that the OCA index could have been a better indicator of 
countries' readiness to join the single currency than were the Maastricht criteria, as the 
latter were not able to identify the ill-prepared countries. The recent troubles of some 
euro area members make this clear. Our results should thus be pondered when deciding   18 
to allow new members into the euro area before they have attained a sufficient level of 
convergence, particularly in terms of business-cycle synchronization and trade linkages. 
 
References: 
Achsani, N and Partisiwi, T (2010) Testing the feasibility of ASEAN+3 single currency 
comparing  optimum  currency  area  and  clustering  approach,  International  Research 
Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 37, pp. 79-84. 
Bangaké, C (2008) Exchange rate volatility and optimum currency area: evidence from 
Africa, Economics Bulletin, 6(12), pp. 1-10. 
Bayoumi, T and Eichengreen, B (1997) Ever closer to heaven? An optimum-currency-
area index for European countries, European Economic Review, Volume 41, Issues 3-5, 
pp. 761-770. 
Blanchard, O (2007) Current account deficits in rich countries, NBER Working Paper 
Number 12925. 
Bénassy-Quéré, A and Lahrèche-Révil, A (2000) The Euro as a monetary anchor in the 
CEECs, Open Economies Review, Volume 11, Number 4, pp. 303-321. 
Cincibuch, M and Vávra, D (2001) Toward the European Monetary Union: a need for 
exchange rate flexibility? Eastern European Economics, Volume 39, Number 6, pp. 23-
64. 
Christodoulakis, N (2009), Ten years of EMU: convergence, divergence and new policy 
priorities, National Institute Economic Review, Volume 208, Number 1, pp. 86-100. 
Dellas,  H  and  Tavlas,  G  (2009)  An  optimum-currency-area  odyssey,  Journal  of 
International Money and Finance, vol. 28(7), pp. 1117-1137.   19 
European Parliament (1998) Adjustment to asymmetric shocks, Directorate-General for 
Research Working Paper, Economic Affairs Series, ECON 104. 
Feldstein, M (1997) The political economy of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union: political sources of an economic liability, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Volume 11, Issue 4, pp. 3-22. 
Frankel, J and Rose, A (1997) Is EMU more justifiable ex post than ex ante?, European 
Economic Review, Volume 41, Issues 3-5, pp. 753-760. 
Frankel, J and Rose, A (1998) The endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria, 
Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 449, pp. 1009-1025. 
Geppert,  K  and  Stephan,  A  (2008)  Regional  disparities  in  the  European  Union: 
convergence and agglomeration, Papers in Regional Science, Volume 87, Issue 2, pp. 
193-217. 
Horváth,  R  (2005)  Exchange  rate  variability,  pressures  and  optimum  currency  area 
criteria: some empirical evidence from the 1990s, Applied Economics Letters, Volume 
12, Issue 15, pp. 919-922. 
Horváth,  R  (2007)  Ready  for  Euro?  Evidence  on  EU  new  member  states,  Applied 
Economics Letters, Volume 14, Issue 14, pp. 1083-1086. 
Kim,  Y  and  Chow,  H  (2003)  Optimum  currency  area  in  Europe:  an  alternative 
assessment, Economics Letters, Volume 81, Issue 3, pp. 297-304. 
Krugman, P (1991) Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of Political 
Economy, Volume 99, Number 3, pp. 483-499. 
Krugman, P (1993) Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU, in F Torres and F Giavazzi 
(Eds) Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union, Cambridge University 
Press.   20 
Sadeh, T (2005) Who can adjust to the euro?, The World Economy, Volume 28, Issue 
11, pp. 1651–1678. 
Schweickert, R (2001) Assessing the advantages of EMU-enlargement for the EU and 
the accession countries: a comparative indicator approach, Kiel Working Papers 1080. 
Shelburne, R (2010) Current account deficits in European emerging markets, UNECE 





We thank Esmeralda and Joaquim Ramalho, Fernanda Peixe, Aurora Galego and José 
Caetano  for  valuable  comments.  The  usual  disclaimer  applies.  We  gratefully 
acknowledge partial financial support from  Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia 
(FCT), program FEDER/POCI 2010. 
 